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I.

Introduction

Two phenomena dominate reports about blockchain-based transactions—that they will disrupt
and displace legacy banking, securities, and trade intermediaries, and that they present new or greater
opportunities for hiding proceeds of crimes or corruption. This essay does not deal with the former
topic. Rather, the organizers of the symposium at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia School of
Law asks me to consider the latter question. It proved to be a tough assignment.
This essay looks at the separate questions of (1) the degree to which permission-less blockchain
transactions will disrupt current anti-money laundering (AML) regimes and enforcement efforts, and (2)
what efforts governments that have agreed to pursue goals of deterrence and detection of money
laundering may need to initiate as blockchain-based transactions become more common.
My thought process has moved through stages and, finally, has focused on three silos of
potential concerns about blockchain technologies. In the first silo are blockchain technologies as
technologies. I assign to this first silo the lowest level of concerns because of their potential for
inclusion, security and integrity. I do not favor regulating technologies; such regulation will be outdated
too fast.
The second silo contains cryptocurrencies and other crypto-assets or products and services
related to them that are offered in compliance with applicable domestic laws where the user of the
product or services is domiciled. I assign a low-to-low-middle level of concern to these crypto assets but
recognize and discuss below that this “grade” could change.
In the third silo, I have bad actors whose products and services are designed for illicit purposes,
and opportunists that offer products and services they do not have and that have no intention of
delivering products or services or allowing redemption of value delivered to them. This third silo gets a
big red flag from me – and this silo will require continued attention from domestic and global law
enforcement agencies.
Part of the reason that I see a low or low-to-low-middle level of concern for the first two silos is
that, for the immediate future at least, that traditional financial services “gatekeepers” in payments,
securities, and commodities will continue to play vital roles in deterring and detecting money laundering
and terrorism finance efforts here and abroad. The presence of regulated “gatekeepers” may not
forestall the need for new legal requirements or enforcement systems forever, but their presence in the
marketplaces of today reduce the need for immediate action and allow legislatures and regulators more
time to observe crypto innovations and determine their next steps.
As a subset of the third silo, for the time being at least, are the new brands of governmentbacked cryptocurrencies, such as the Petro from Venezuela and those that Russia, China, and other
governments, and the special challenges they may pose to AML legal regimes and, separately, to the
United States Dollar as the global reserve currency that it has represented since World War II. These
government-backed cryptocurrencies also challenge longstanding concepts of sovereigns’ control over
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“legal tender” 1 inside their own borders and their potential sponsors are designing them to avoid
economic sanctions imposed by other governments.
The balance of this essay proceeds as follows: Part II provides background on permission-less
blockchains and, separately, recent interest by governments in issuing cryptocurrencies themselves.
Part III provides background on the three stages of value laundering – (1) initial “placement” of illicit
proceeds, (2) “layering” through multiple forms of property or banks or banking systems to obscure its
source or ownership, and (3) “integration” or emergence of assets that look legitimate to the outsider.
Part IV reviews different challenges to traditional means of detecting value laundering that nongovernment-issued cryptocurrencies, permission-less blockchains, and government-sponsored
cryptocurrencies pose. This Part looks at the vital roles that “gatekeepers” play in AML enforcement in
the United States. Part IV also explains how (1) regulators and law enforcement authorities are already
using new tools to trace and identify blockchain-based transactions that are in furtherance of illicit
activities, and (2) government-issued cryptocurrencies and more private and opaque cryptocurrencies
may make detection of money laundering more difficult. Part V explains my view that permission-less
blockchains are not our major problem in the global campaigns against money laundering (regardless of
the purposes for which money laundering is attempted) but finding someone to regulate in future may
be.
Part VI briefly evaluates efforts by global authorities, such as the G-20’s Financial Action Task
Force (“FATF”) regarding the regulation of cryptocurrencies and the European Parliament’s 5th AntiMoney Laundering Directive (“AMLD5”), some of which goes into effect on January 10, 2020, 2 to reframe the AML and market-protection regulatory recommendations to cover issues relating to
cryptocurrencies and other crypto-assets.
Part VII states some conclusions and identifies questions for additional research.
II.

Permission-less Blockchains, Cryptocurrencies and Other Crypto-Assets, and Special
Issues Raised by Government-sponsored Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies and crypto-assets on permission-less blockchains offer time-stamped publicly
viewable records of transfers of rights that rely on peer-to-peer distributed “servers to generate
computational proof of the chronological order of transactions” that itself is “secure as long as
honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker
nodes.” 3

This Part looks at types of blockchain technologies, potential risks associated with some
cryptocurrencies and crypto-assets, and special issues raised by government-sponsored cryptocurrencies.
31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2018) (“United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes
of Federal reserve banks and national banks),” legally served to pay debts, charges, taxes, and dues, originally from
the Coinage Act of 1965).
2
Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU)
2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering or terrorist
financing and amending Directive 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EU relevance), at para. 53, Document
32018L0843, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/843/oj.
3
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 1 (undated), www.bitcoin.org (allowing
electronic payment systems to work based on “cryptographic proof … without the need for a trusted third party”)
[hereinafter “Nakamoto”].
1

3

Before proceeding, it is important to establish a baseline understanding of what a blockchain is. I asked
three experts from different backgrounds about the terms “distributed ledger technologies” and
“blockchain.” These three views are shown in the order in which I received them:
Patrice Lyons, a technology attorney based in Reston, Virginia and Washington, D.C., responded:
From my perspective, a blockchain is considered a “digital entity” (see definition in
…ITU-T Recommendation X.1255), and there are many ways of configuring digital
entities in this context. The origins of this technology go back many years … 4
My co-panelist at the “Smart Regulation” Public Policy Conference, Peter A. Wayner, a
programmer and author of several books on cryptocurrencies and blockchains, has explained a blockchain
as:
A chain of blocks that track the sequence of transactions for cryptocurrencies provide a
unique opportunity for public analysis of spending patterns. While the nominal identity of
each person is not recorded as a human readable name or common identification value
like the Social Security number, the public key used to sign the transaction can provide
much of the same value. All of the transactions associated with the key of a particular
person are easy to find on the blockchain I the publicly accessible information. Even if
the transactions are routed through different exchanges or intermediaries, all of the
cryptocoins that flow through the wallet can be flagged. 5
Michigan State University’s Professor Carla Reyes explains distributed ledger technologies,
which are broader than the universe of blockchains, as follows:
... uses the [distributed ledger technology or DLT] to refer generally to ‘computer
software that is distributed, runs on peer-to-peer networks, and offers a transparent,
verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-management system maintained through a
consensus mechanism rather than by a trusted third-party intermediary that guarantees
execution.” 6
In simplified terms, then, a blockchain is a method of storing records of ownership or of assets and
transactions that uses a version of a distributed ledger. 7 A distributed ledger keeps records “in many

Patrice A. Lyons, email to Sarah Jane Hughes, June 8, 2019 4:53 PM. Copy on file with Sarah Jane Hughes. Ms.
Lyons also directs attention to the term “Digital entity data model” in ITU-T Recommendation X. 1255 at § 7.1,
which focuses on “[t]he essential fixed attribute of a DE is its associated unique persistent identifier ….” This, she
explains, is “an evolution in the technology of the early Internet where IP addresses resolve to ports on machines.”
Patrice A. Lyons, email to Sarah Jane Hughes, June 11, 2019 4:10 PM. Copy on file with Sarah Jane Hughes. Ms.
Lyons is affiliated with the Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI) in Reston, VA. For further, highly
useful analysis, see Patrice A. Lyons and Robert E. Kahn, Blocks as digital entries: A standards perspective, in NFAIS
Conference: Blockchain for Scholarly Publishing (Bonnie Lawlor, ed.), 38 J. Inform. Servs. & Use, 173-185 (2018),
https://content.iopress.com.443/journals/information-services-and-use.
5
See Peter A. Wayner, HANDBOOK OF OPTICAL PROPERTIES: DIGITAL CASH: COMMERCE ON THE NET, 2 (AP Professional 1997).
6
Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373, 379-380 & n. 21 & 28 (2019) [hereinafter
“Reyes 2019”]. For additional background, see Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Crypto Law, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 39091 (2017).
7
See Artemis Caro, BLOCKCHAIN: THE BEGINNERS GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN &
CRYPTOCURRENCY 12 (Cryptonaire Press, 2018).
4
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different locations simultaneously.” 8 And a distributed ledger theoretically is auditable, verifiable, and
transparent.
A. Distinctions Between “Permissioned” and “Permission-less” Blockchains
A matrix of blockchains would reveal several options: public and less public “permission-less”
blockchains and permissioned blockchains. It is important to differentiate these forms of blockchains for
a variety of reasons.
1. Public, permission-less blockchains
In a public, permission-less blockchain, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, all participants are
theoretically equal. 9 There is no centralized management or authority that can be required by law to
report data or keep a set of records prescribed by a government other than those inherent to their
business model, or even any central authority to respond to legal process. The exception to this
“equality” principle is that some participants play key roles in validating transactions on the blockchain,
including “miners” of bitcoins who perform verification and validation functions but are not known to all
participants. (The subject of the unknowable validators of public, permission-less blockchains is
discussed by Professor Angela Walch in the paper she presented at the May 2019 “Smart Regulation”
Public Policy Conference, which at the time was entitled “Intermediaries Who Must Not Be Named? The
Keepers of the Public Blockchain.” 10)
Transactions on public blockchains are all open-to-view and relatable to each other in a chain.
They are time-stamped. One can follow a chain of transfers from the first entry to the latest entry in
time, and to ascribe to the last entry the status of being the “owner” or custodian of the related crypto
assets at that time. It also is possible to follow transfers from one address to another by comparing the
relative lengths of the chains with similar initial addresses to the current “owner” or custodian. My copanelist, Peter A. Wayner, demonstrated how the public can follow transactions at the “Smart
Regulation” Public Policy Conference.
2. Public, permissioned blockchains
A public, permissioned blockchain is a category under which EOS and Ripple belong. Some
participants in this category of blockchain are more equal than others. 11 The network appoints certain
participants to be privileged over others. 12 These participants can run the node, and they have abilities
not shared by the general public. 13 Key features of these blockchains is the ability of the privileged
participants to keep certain records. For this reason, privilege holders on these networks might be
required to report specific types of records of customers and transactions or to respond to legal process.
See id., at 12.
See Arnold Daniels, “The rise of private permissionless blockchains-part 1, October 18, 2018,
https://medium.com/ltoneetwork/the-rise-of-private-blockchains-part-1-4c39bea2e2be (hereinafter “Daniels”).
10
Angela Walch, Intermediaries Who Must Not Be Named? The Keepers of the Public Blockchain, draft paper
presented at the Public Policy Conference on Smart Regulation and the Future of Financial Services Regulation,
Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, May 16, 2019. Copy available from Professor Walsh, at
awalsh@stmarytx.edu.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
8
9
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A public, permissioned blockchain is one source of future public records systems, such as those for
recording ownership of tangible property or providing public notice of security-interest claims.
The third and fourth categories are private blockchains, which are not the focus of this essay.
The discussion below, accordingly, is for completeness of description.
3. Private, permission-less blockchains
A private, permission-less blockchain has nodes that “will only acknowledge [other nodes’
existence], but not share any data” with them to this point in time. 14
One attraction of the private, permission-less blockchains is that each “smart contract” that may
be used “automatically creates a private (side-) chain associated with that contact.” 15 In addition,
although a node may hold more than one “side-chain,” one node will not hold all of those in existence
for the larger chain.
Each node still operates as a repository. 16 Only designated persons or organizations get
permission to read specific nodes; designated persons will require cryptographic signatures to gain
access to reading. 17 To have reading privileges, one needs both the unique identifier (address) and the
URL of the node that has a copy of the smart contract and associated chain. 18 Also, each node will hold
only data needed to service its users – an “agent-centric” solution. 19 These chains inside private chains
make the task of ferreting out specific transactions more complicated because they are not visible.
These blockchains represent more powerful opportunities to hide assets because “smart
contracts on these private networks, not only define who is allowed to perform contract actions but also
who is allowed to read the contract and all related data.” 20 First, the “smart contract” manages any
contract actions required and created by this node, making it an ideal “location” from which to move
those assets in the intermediate “layering” steps needed for traditional money laundering. Owners of
crypto assets on private, permission-less blockchains are not likely to spend them outside a narrow
sphere of prospective counterparties. This narrow sphere of prospective counterparties and the
restrictions on permissions help protect the identities of users of these blockchains.
Experimentation with private, permission-less blockchains has been limited so far. As of October
2018, one commentator, Arnold Daniels, had identified only three chains – the Holochain, LTO Network,
and Monet. Holochain allows “users share information peer-to-peer on a need-to-know basis.” 21 The
LTO Network is Daniels’ own project: it “run[s] trustless workflows, targeting multinationals and
governments…. The process has a strong focus on privacy and GDPR compliance.” 22 The last, as of
February 2019, is Monet. Monet may be the most likely to be used to hide proceeds of financial crimes:
it allows users to build “ad-hoc, short-lived chains, with mobile devices acting as nodes for the
See id. at 2.
Id. (emphasis original).
16
Id.
17
See id.
18
See id.
19
See id. at 2-3.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 3.
22
Id.
14
15

6

participants.” 23 Other crypto assets are in development that will enhance privacy protections for
users. 24
Private, permission-less blockchains share features with a cluster of “burn phones” or “bearer”
instruments -- each facilitating the placement, layering or re-emergence of the assets or transactions
involved. Daniels’ observations cemented this image: “Collaborations are fluid as both participants come
and go and nodes may be discovered based on location.” 25 Private, permission-less blockchains offer a
lava-lamp-like fluidity of opportunity, a nearly perpetual series of opportunities to share data with only
those with a need-to-know for a phase or a part of a part of a transfer or storage of assets. These
blockchains certainly appear to be more powerful potential tools for money launderers than any bearer
bond or other bearer instrument – based outsiders at least know who the issuer of the instrument is
because that party is named in the instrument. This does not mean that all private, permission-less
blockchains are designed for nefarious purposes. It means that they bear watching as they develop.
4. Private, permissioned blockchains
The last category is a private, permissioned blockchain. This category includes examples such as
include Hyperledger Fabric and the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance. 26 How do these systems handle
permissions? We look again to “smart contracts,” which “do define permissions.” 27 Using a private,
permission-less network drives some of the activity to a private “side-chain” – one associated with a
“smart contract,” in particular. 28
This private, permissioned category both enables assets to be moved when a pre-established
event coded at inception of a relationship or series of transactions triggers the next phase of the
transaction and to be stored in an environment in which it likely will be harder for an outsider to
observe them, but that allows the assets to be moved via “smart contracts” and transfer onwards.
Accordingly, this fourth category – like the third – creates new opportunities to use blockchains and
“smart contracts” to transact financial crimes or launder assets to emergence in “clean” form on preestablished timetables or the occurrence of the prescribed event. Will these transactions be observable
in the open at all? It seems that they are not intended to be.
However, as I discuss later, when it comes time to exchange the assets for tangible assets or
bank credits, the legacy entities – my “gatekeepers” -- that laws here and elsewhere currently requires
to know-their-customers, maintain records, and report certain types of transactions—will face civil and
criminal liabilities if they do not comply with applicable legal requirements.
Permissioned blockchains are not the focus of this essay, however. The requirement of
permission to use these blockchains takes them out of the scope of the assignment that Professors
Vartanian and Ledig asked me to undertake. Where “permission” is required, a key feature of other
blockchains – their lack of centralized management of the technology and the records that contributes
Id.
Peter Van Valkenburg, conversation with Sarah Jane Hughes, May 17, 2019. No transcript of this conversation is
available.
25
Id. at 4.
26
Id. at 2.
27
Id.
28
Id.
23
24
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to trust and integrity of records – is not present. Private, permissioned blockchains also offer
opportunities to replace current databases of records, including those created and managed by banks
and securities firms.
B. Special Issues Raised by Government-sponsored Cryptocurrencies
Governments such as the Russia Federation have spoken publicly of their intentions to create
“official cryptocurrencies.” 29 Russia’s announced purpose is to thwart economic sanctions imposed on
Russian organizations and citizens. 30
It is unclear whether governments such as Russia that sponsor cryptocurrencies will use their
sovereign rights to deem their sponsored cryptocurrencies as “legal tender,” the legal means to pay
taxes and debts. 31 If not, this cryptocurrency might operate only as an external currency, not for
domestic purposes, such as China’s current, external-only version of the yuan or renminbi, referred to as
the CYH. 32 It also is unclear whether owners of Russia’s cryptocurrency will be allowed to exchange it for
rubles, Russia’s legal tender.
Russia and China also have indicated their plans to issue gold-backed cryptocurrencies for their
own internal or external-trade reasons. 33 Another goal is to replace the US Dollar as the world’s reserve
currency. 34 Russia’s has used cryptocurrencies such as the Venezuela-government owned Petro, 35 itself

See Rachel McIntosh, Oil-Backed Cryptocurrency Could Hit Russian Markets Soon, FINANCEMAGNETS.COM (February
25, 2019 8:48 GMT+1), https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/oil-backed-cryptocurrencycould-hit-russian-markets-soon/.
30
See Helen Partz, Russia’s Central Bank to Consider Gold-Backed Cryptocurencies for Mutual Settlements,
COINTELEGRAPH.COM, May 23, 2019, https://cointelegraph.com/news/russias-central-bank-to-consider-gold-backedcryptocurrencies-for-mutual-settlements (citing Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Russia Central Bank, giving testimony
before the Duma).
31
The Case of Mixed Money in Ireland, Trin. 2 James I. a.d. 1605 (Davies’s Reports) (upholding the sovereign’s
authority to make, change or debase its money as well as it designation of “mixed money” as legal tender for
payments of taxes and debts; establishing a value that some of the governed found to their disadvantage; and
clarifying that the definition of legal tender is “the stamp, the prince, and the value”). For a recent discussion of
methods that the U.S. has used to thwart competition to the dollar, see Stephen T. Middlebrook and Sarah Jane
Hughes, Substitutes for Legal Tender: Lessons from History for the Regulation of Virtual Currencies, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW, Edward Elgar, 2016, Paper 316, Indiana Legal Studies Research Papers,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per-id=408848.
32
Jeremy Cook, Why does China have two currencies? at 1 (March 14, 2018),
https://www.worldfirst.com/uk/blog/international-business/foreign-exchange-international-business/china-twocurrencies/.
33
See Daniel Palmer, Russian Central Bank to Consider Gold-Backed Cryptocurrency, INDESK.COM, MAY 23, 2019 14:30
UTC, https://www.coindesk.com/russian-central-bank-to-consider-gold-backed-cryptocurrency; Sean AdlTabatabai, Russia and China Roll Out 100% Gold-Backed Currency, March 25, 2018, https://newspunch.com/russiachina-gold-backed-currency/.
34
Id.
35
See Sujha Sundararanajan, Venezuelan President announces oil-backed cryptocurrency, COINDESK.COM (December
4, 2017 4:15 UTC, updated 8:14 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/venezuelan-president-announces-petro-oilbacked-cryptocurrency.
29
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on the U.S. Treasury Department’s SDN list, 36 to help Venezuela evade U.S. economic sanctions, 37 or to
assist Russia’s operations in Crimea, 38 suggest the scope of this threat.
Cryptocurrencies, given the speed at which transfers can be settled compared with legacy bank
transfers, also enhance risks associated with rapid movements of values from nation to nation and could
contribute to broader instability in world markets and national economies. Use of crypto assets to avoid
national securities regulatory regimes or to engage in market manipulation is also worrisome. 39
However, depending on the location of the owners of these Russian or Chinese
cryptocurrencies, the opportunity to locate assets and trace beneficial ownership may still exist. When
the owners seek to move this wealth into more stable financial systems in Europe or Asia than those
from which they come, they are likely to require services of one or more “gatekeeper” intermediaries
subject to the “Four R’s.” For example, investigations of Danske Bank and Deutsche Bank reveal that
Russian oligarchs using banks in Estonia, Denmark, and elsewhere have transferred wealth to more
stable banking systems and onwards to invest in real estate and other assets. 40 Movement of funds into
more stable financial systems in the EU, Canada or the United States are examples of safety-seeking and
the “emergence” or integration that is the last stage of money laundering.
III.

Background on Money Laundering Methods

President Donald J. Trump, , Executive Order 13827 of March 19, 2018, Taking Additional Steps to Address the
Situation in Venezzuela, March 19, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-ordertaking-additional-steps-address-situation-venezuela/ [hereinafter “Executive Order 13827-Venezuela”]. For
additional discussion, see Nikhilesh De, Trump orders new sanctions against Venezuela’s crypto, WWW.CONDESK.COM
(March 19, 2018 17:00 UTC, updated March 20, 2018 8:59 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/trump-orders-newsanctions-against-venezuelas-national-cryptocurrency.
37
See Simon Shuster, Exclusive: Russia Secretly Helped Venezuela Launch a Cryptocurrency to Evade U.S. Sanctions,
TIME.COM, March 20, 2018, https://time.com/5206835/exclusive-russia-petro-venezuela-cryptocurrency/
(describing the Petro as a “joint venture” between Venezuela and Russia to avoid U.S. sanctions and describing a
September 2017 white paper explaining how cryptocurrencies could “overcome the dominance of Western
currencies” and displace the U.S. Dollar).
38
Helen Partz, Adviser to President of Russia Proposes Digital Currency in Crimea, COINTELEGRAPH.COM (April 22,
2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/adviser-to-president-of-russia-proposes-digital-currency-in-crimea
(quoting Sergey Glazyev who opined that the cryptocurrency was to reduce “cross-border barriers” and attract
foreign investors who “are afraid of sanctions”).
39
See generally, Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web of
Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262 (2014), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1951148.
40
See Richard Milne and Daniel Winter, Danske: anatomy of a money laundering scandal, FIN.TIMES.COM (DEC. 19,
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/519ad6ae-bcd8-11e8-94b2-17176fbf93f5 (mentioning Bank of America
and JPMorgan Chase and reporting events from 2007 until 2015; JPMorgan Chase apparently exited
correspondent banking for the Estonia branch in 2013 for dollar-denominated transactions, citing concerns
with non-resident customers of the branch) [hereinafter “Milne and Winter”]; See Bradley Hope, Patricia
Kowsmann, and Drew Hinshaw, U.S. Probes Danish Bank Over Russia Money Flows, WALL ST. J. at A8 (Sept. 15-16,
2018) (reporting that the SEC received a confidential whistleblower complaint about Danske Bank AS’
involvement in laundering of $150 billion through accounts of non-Estonian account holders at a tiny Danske
Bank branch in Estonia, and implicating Deutsche Bank and Citigroup with transactions into and out of the
Estonian branch) [hereinafter “Hope, Kowsmann, and Hinshaw”]. Both articles reveal how lax internal antimoney-laundering controls and management attitudes contributed to the duration of the behavior being
investigated.
36
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Money laundering is “the concealment of the existence, nature or illegal source of illicit funds in
such a manner that the funds appear legitimate if discovered.” 41 The deterrence-and-detection legal
requirements and enforcement tools are aimed at three stages used to complete the laundering of
funds and at the persons, enterprises, and methods involved:
▪ placement, “in which illicit proceeds are introduced into the financial system;”
▪ layering “in which the criminal attempts to separate the proceeds from the crime through a
series of transactions”; and
▪ integration “where the illicit funds re-enter the economy disguised as legitimate funds.” 42
For any reader less familiar with these steps in money laundering, this Part includes a brief discussion of
each stage. This essay also uses publicly available reports on the current probe of Danske Bank AS to
demonstrate how these traditional means facilitate money laundering in a scandal in which other major
international banks, including Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase may be
implicated. 43
A. Placement of Funds or Assets into Vehicles That Enable Layering
The first task of money launderers, regardless of their reasons for seeking to obscure the origin
of funds or assets, is to find a location or an asset in which to “place” them, initially -- preferably into a
form of account or property that can be moved along quickly, repeatedly, and securely into the first
“layering” transaction, described in the next section. Traditional choices for initial placements have
included banks, broker-dealers in securities, insurance brokers, and a host of sellers of tangible property
including real estate, motor vehicles, boats, jewelry, and art.
In the United States we apply the requirements mentioned in the first paragraph of this Part to
most of the providers mentioned here, but the specific “customer identification” requirements of
Section 326 of the USA Patriot Act 44 depend in some respects on the provider or seller chosen.

Statement of Michael J. Murphy, Senior Deputy Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Business Community’s
Compliance with Federal Money Laundering Statutes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. On Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1990).
42
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, National Money Laundering Risk Assessment, at 2 n.1 (2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicitfinance/Documents/National%20Money%20Laundering%20Risk%20Assessment%20%E2%80%93%2006-122015.pdf [hereinafter “NMLRA 2015”]. Note: the 2015 report does not address risks presented by virtual
currencies or blockchain-based activity. See id. at 22-85 (discussion of specific financial and commercial activity
used in money laundering). The Department also issues a U.S. Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment periodically.
43
See Milne and Winter, supra note 40; Hope, Kowsmann, and Hinshar, supra note 40. Both articles reveal how
lax internal anti-money-laundering controls and management attitudes contributed to the duration of the
behavior being investigated. Both articles reveal how lax internal anti-money-laundering controls and
management attitudes contributed to the duration of the behavior being investigated.
For additional discussion, see text accompanying note 40, supra, and notes 53-55, infra.
44
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism, tit. III (the International Money Laundering abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001), Pub. L.
Pub. L. 107-56, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (October 26, 2001) (codified in various titles of the United States Code).
41
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Nearly adult in the United States will have had to prove their identity when they seek to open a
new account since the USA Patriot Act 45 became effective. This is true regardless of whether the
“financial institution” at which they were seeking to open the account or obtain a loan or other financial
service for the first time was an account at a bank, a nonbank financial services provider, a brokerdealer, or an insurance company.
If the person opening the account or conducting a transaction presents $10,000 or more in cash,
then US law requires that the recipient financial institution report that transaction to the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) if the recipient is a bank or credit union, or a broker-dealer, or
a dealer in precious metals, gemstones, or jewelry. 46 If the amount is less than $10,000, a report might
be required if (a) one or more transactions related to each other occurs in a brief period or in a “related
transaction,” 47 (b) the customer made repeated transactions of smaller amounts that the recipient
believes are intended to avoid the $10,000 or more threshold and suggest that “structuring” to avoid
being reported, 48 or (c) the buyer uses certain monetary instruments with face amounts of $3,000 or
more. 49 Such transactions also could be deemed “suspicious,” giving rise to obligations to file
“Suspicious Activity Reports.” 50 “Persons engaged in trades or business” in the United States also must
report transactions with customers in a $10,000 or more-threshold basis with reports going to the
Internal Revenue Service. 51
Similar requirements do not exist in all countries. The U.S. Department of Treasury and FinCEN,
and other intergovernmental organizations, publish reports on countries whose anti-money-laundering
measures are perceived to be weaker than our requirements. 52 Person seeking to obscure the origin of
funds or assets or the beneficial ownership of those funds or assets traditionally may see benefit in
making initial “placements” in banks or other intermediaries occur in a country with weaker customeridentification/account-opening, record-keeping, or transaction-reporting requirements.
Some entities involved in “placement” or “layering” outside of the United States are still subject
to U.S laws because they are regulated by U.S. regulators. This was true in the investigation that led to
the settlement with Rabobank National Association, a California-based subsidiary of Cooperative
Rabobank, U.A. in the Netherlands, for engaging in money laundering. 53 This is true in the pending
investigation of Danske Bank, as well as of Deutsche Bank and Citigroup offices abroad are regulated by

31 C.F.R. Part 1010 (2018).
Id.
47
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2018).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
26 U.S.C. § 6050l (cash transaction reporting by persons engaged in a trade or business). For compliance
information relating to this statute, see Internal Revenue Service, Form 8300, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f8300.pdf (last updated Dec. 2018).
52
See, e.g., NMLRA 2015, supra note 16.
53
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Press Release, Rabobank NA Pleads Guilty, Agrees to Pay Over $360 Million (February 7,
2018), https://www.justice.gov (guilty plea included conspiracy to defraud the United States, obstruction of
examination of a financial institution, and concealing deficiencies in its AML program, which included taking
“hundreds of millions of dollars in untraceable cash” into its branches in California, and later transferring them via
wire transfers, checks, and cash without proper identification).
45
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U.S. regulators. 54 Funds apparently given over to the Estonian branch of Danske Bank by non-Estonian
customers of the branch and later moved into or from that branch in transactions involving dollardenominated wire transfers handled by Deutsche Bank or in transactions from Citigroup’s Moscow
office to the Estonia branch of Danske Bank. 55
For cryptocurrencies, the source of “customer identification” requirements depends on whether
there is a central manager of the currency or a service provider and whether that person qualifies as a
“money service business” subject to FinCEN’s registration requirements. 56 New York State’s Department
of Financial Services requires the holders of BitLicenses to record and maintain records of their
customers. 57 The Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act (“URVCBA”), not yet enacted in
any state, requires that licensees and registrants keep records of their customers and their customers’
transactions. 58
B. “Layering” assets through multiple transfers or forms of property, banks, or banking
systems
“Layering” is the stage during which funds or assets move away from their original placements
toward the eventual, integration as clean money, bank credits, or other clean assets that money
launderers’ clients seek.
More than 20 years ago, the United States Department of the Treasury considered wire
transfers to be “the arteries of the international financial system,” and proclaimed that “use of wire
transfers is a necessity for many large scale [sic] money laundering schemes. Wire transfers are used
both to move funds out of (or into) the United States and to confuse the money trail.” 59 Multiple wire
transfers were used to repatriate to the United States funds originally derived from illicit drug sales in
the United States but shipped or carried abroad and “placed” in banks there. 60 The value that these wire
transfers represented would move through banks with offices in New York, for example, and then
possibly move on inside the United States or wherever else the owner wished to have the funds
available with the appearance of legitimacy in their ownership.

Hope, Kowsmann, and Hinshaw, supra note 40.
Id.
56
31 C.F.R. § 1010.
57
23 NYCRR § 200.12 (2015) (specifying “books and records” to be created and maintained by BitLicense holders).
58
Uniform Law Comm’n, Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act, § 302 (2017),
www.uniformlaws.org (“registrants” have alerted specific state regulators that they are engaging in “virtualcurrency business activity” in their state but have volumes of business of less than $35,000 annually; as they reach
the dollar threshold, registrants must apply for licenses and may continue to do business in that state unless their
application is denied). As noted in the Author’s Note, I served as Reporter for this project.
59
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Press Release, The Treasury Department released two final rules Thursday that will for
the first time require uniform recordkeeping for wire transfers under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), Dec. 22, 1994,
https://www.fincen.gov/news-releases/treasury-department-released-two-final-rules-thursday-will-first-timerequire.
60
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Recordkeeping for Funds Transfers by Banks
and Transmittals of Funds by Other Financial Institutions, 54 Fed. Reg. 45,769 (Oct. 31, 1989) (proposed rule for
international wire transfers or transmittals).
54
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The Treasury Department originally proposed in 1990 to extend its Bank Secrecy Act recordkeeping to domestic wire transfers and funds transmittals. 61 This proposal specifically included among
the non-bank transmitters to be covered currency exchanges, telegraph companies, and registered
securities broker-dealers. 62 The department eventually promulgated in 1994 an enhanced
recordkeeping requirement for bank and nonbank financial institutions handling funds transfers and
funds transmittals in amounts of $3,000 or more. 63
A second proposed rule would require the “financial institution” to capture information about
the originator or sender 64 of the first wire transfer in a sequence and keep that information “traveling
along” through as many layers of wire transfers as happened until the funds arrived in the beneficiary’s
bank. 65 This proposal had to overcome opposition based in the fact that the formats used for wire
transfers at that time had limited “fields” for information, and the habit was only to pass along the
information needed by the originating bank to reach the next bank in the sequence until the last
“payment order” 66 in the wire transfer that ended with the beneficiary’s bank, and ultimately to reach
the beneficiary. This effort culminated with what is known as “the travel rule” that required that the
originator’s information flow through the payment orders to the end of the funds transfer or funds
transmittal. 67
Similar regulations require maintenance of records in domestic funds transfers, 68 and for banks
and nonbanks to maintain records of international funds transfers and transmittals of funds. 69 FinCEN’s
“Travel Rule,” which applies only to funds transfers of $3,000 or more and to the extent that a bank or
“money transmitter” is involved does not apply to all cryptocurrency transactions, Still, because of a
September 2010 amendment, the Travel Rule reaches many cross-border electronic transmittals of
funds “denominated in any currency,” 70 and can serve as a powerful tool for law enforcement agencies
U.S. Dept’ of Treasury, Proposed Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Recordkeeping for
Funds Transfers by Banks and Transmittals of Funds by Other Financial Institutions, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (Oct. 15,
1990).
62
Id. at 41,704 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(f), the precursor to current 31 C.F.R. § 1010.330).
63
12 C.F.R. Part 219 (2018) (Threshold for the Requirement to Collect, Retain, and Transmit Information on Funds
Transfers and Transmittals of Funds) (Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System version of this regulation).
For more information see, Fin. Crimes Enf. Net., Threshold for the Requirement to Collect, retain, and Transmit
Information on Funds Transfers and Transmittals of Funds, 60 Fed. Reg. 220-21 (Jan. 3, 1995).
64
12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(3) (defining “funds transfer,” “originator,” “beneficiary,” and “payment order” for
provisions related to banks, and “transmittal of funds” to include a funds transfer and the non-bank transmittal).
For more information, see 31 C.F.R. §103.11(jj).
65
Fin. Crimes Enf. Network, 60 Fed. Reg. 23401 (Jan. 3, 1995) (this rule was codified originally at 31 C.F.R. §
103.33(g)). FinCEN and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System jointly promulgated a separate rule
known colloquially as the “Funds Transfer Rule,” codified originally at 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(e) recordkeeping
requirements for banks), 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(f) (recordkeeping for nonbank financial institutions).
66
See Sarah Jane Hughes, Policing Money Laundering Through Fund Transfers: A Critique of Regulation Under the
Bank Secrecy Act, 67 IND. L. J. 283 (1992) (describing how “payment orders” are comprised and how the combine to
constitute a “funds transfer” on an end-to-end basis).
67
31 C.F.R. 31 C.F.R. § 1010 (2018) (definitions) (originally codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(g)).
68
12 U.S.C. § 1829b(B)(2) (2018) (bank and nonbank financial institutions required to maintain records on
transmittals of funds); 31 C.F.R. § 1010 (originally codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(jj)).
69
12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(3) (2018).
70
U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Cross-Border Electronic Transmittals of Funds, 75
Fed. Reg. 60377, 60396 (September 2010), (including definitions originally codified at 103.14).
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and regulators to observe the movements of funds through regulated “Four R’s” entities. These tools
were useful in identifying funds flows, for example, from the Russian Federation and Estonia, that a
whistleblower used to alert the Securities and Exchange Commission. 71
C. Emergence of Funds or Assets in Forms That Look Legitimate or that Arrive
In the final phase of money laundering -- integration, funds finally emerge as funds or real or
tangible assets that look legitimate to those around them. This is the goal of the cadres of bank and
non-bank and other professionals that aid in the process.
Integration or emergence is the step that may leave the federal government’s focus on
regulated entities as a viable tool in a blockchain-based future. This will be the case as long as money
launderers and their clients will need to rely on regulated entities as they have in the past to use some
proceeds in the mainstream economy.
IV.

Challenges and Opportunities that Cryptocurrencies or Other Crypto-Assets Present to
Current AML Efforts and Remedies Currently Available to U.S. Law Enforcement Irrelevant

Professors Vartanian and Ledig asked the interesting question -- whether permission-less
blockchains will render AML detection and enforcement laws and protocols inadequate. My answer to
this question is “no” – or at least “not yet.” Although most of the Bank Secrecy Act and FinCEN’s
regulations enforcing the former’s many provisions have been focused on providers against whom the
“Four R’s” were designed to work, at least for the immediate future those regulated providers will
continue to be important to detection of money laundering through cryptocurrencies and other crypto
assets. That information that FinCEN already requires these providers to have and to report can be
augmented by reconstructions from public blockchains. Part of the reason for my answer is that many
cryptocurrency transactions are not as anonymous as previously thought. 72
To evaluate why existing regulatory tools will remain useful, we should review what has
happened since 2013 when, as described above, FinCEN published its first guidance on which
cryptocurrency functions constituted “money services” and, accordingly, whose providers should
register with FinCEN as “money services businesses.“ Following that review, we need to look at specific
requirements in force that serve AML deterrence, detection and enforcement purposes – assuming law
enforcement agencies have suitable resources going forward. This Part also describes other tools
available to detect money laundering through permission-less blockchains.
A. FinCEN’s Baseline Guidance on Administrators of and Exchanges dealing in
“Convertible” Virtual Currencies as Subject to its “Money Services Businesses” Regulations
FinCEN’s March 2013 guidance on virtual currency 73 issued by a central management and thirdparty providers that offer comparable intermediary services to owners of cryptocurrencies expanded
Hope, Kowsmann, and Hinshaw, supra note 40.
See Emerging Tehcnology from the arXiv, Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, MIT
TECH. REV. 1 (August 23, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608716/bitcoin-transactions-arent-asanonymous-as-everyone-hoped/.
73
Fin. Crimes Enf. Net., U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering,
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, FIN-2013-G001, at 1 (March 18, 2013), www.fincen.gov [hereinafter
“FinCEN March 2013 Guidance”].
71
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FinCEN’s 2011 “prepaid access” provider regulations 74 to reach many products and providers in the
cryptocurrency industry. The perimeter captured many provider-intermediaries of related products and
services and required that they register with FinCEN as “money services businesses,” 75 even if no state
law required them to be licensed as “money transmitters.” Additionally, as noted above, FinCEN’s
customer-identification-program and “Travel Rule” requirements attached to these providerintermediaries. Thus, for providers of convertible virtual currencies who do business in the United
States, FinCEN’s 2013 Guidance expanded the ability of regulators to oversee issuers, administrators,
distributors, acceptors, transmitters and exchangers. 76
“Prepaid access” transactions, in turn, are subject to FinCEN’s 2011 rules on anti-moneylaundering compliance requirements. 77 The 2011 final rule imposed on persons offering “prepaid
access” five types of duties – registration with FinCEN, 78 record-creation and keeping and reporting
requirements, 79 anti-money-laundering compliance program creation and implementation, 80 currencytransaction reporting, 81 and suspicious-activity reporting. 82
Failure to comply with the requirements FinCEN has imposed on prepaid access transactions
include the array of AML criminal sanctions. 83 Failure to register as a “money services business” (“MSB”)
subjects the entity to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1960, which penalizes MSBs) that (1) fail to register
themselves with FinCEN, (2) engage in unlicensed activity that state law prohibits to those not holding
the appropriate license(s), or (3) knowingly receive the proceeds of illicit activity. 84 It is important to
note that the first and second circumstances defined in Section 1960 are strict-liability, non-scienter
criminal offenses for which courts impose substantial monetary penalties and prison sentences. Only
the third is a scienter-based crime. Accordingly, participation or being and not intent is not required to
establish liability.
The regulatory perimeter that FinCEN created in 2013 did not reach permission-less, public
blockchains such as Bitcoin because it has no central management. 85 As a result, permission-less,
blockchain-based transactions offer a competing avenue for moving value, including currency positions,

Fin. Crimes Enf. Network, Bank Secrecy Act Regulations -Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid
Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45403 (July 29, 2011) (renaming “stored value” as “prepaid access” and defining the term,
imposing suspicious activity reporting , customer information and transaction information recordkeeping
requirements on providers as well as sellers of prepaid access, requiring registration with FinCEN of providers, and
exempting categories of prepaid access products and services “posing lower risks of money laundering and
terrorist financing” from some requirements). The rule went into effect on September 27, 2011 with full
compliance with 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 required by January 29, 2012. Id. at 45403.
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31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2018).
76
FinCEN 2013 Guidance, supra note 73, at 1.
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2011 Prepaid Access Regulations, supra note 60.
78
31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2018).
79
31 C.F.R. § 1022.420 (2018).
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31 C.F.R. § 1022.210 (2018).
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31 C.F.R. § 1022.420 (2018).
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outside of the regulatory perimeter previously established by FinCEN. These transactions also offer
speedy and inexpensive, cross-border transactions 86 for trade and remittance purposes.
FinCEN has not yet extended its 2013 “prepaid access” guidance to transactions on permissionless blockchains where no intermediary is involved. As a result, there are no requirements enforced by
the United States Treasury Department for permission-less blockchains per se or the individuals who
participate in their consensus mechanisms to verify transfers in the United States to be registered as
“money services businesses,” to keep records, to implement anti-money-laundering compliance
programs, or to report “suspicious transactions” to the authorities.
Because of FinCEN’s designation of “money services businesses” to include persons administering or
exchanging virtual currencies that can be converted to fiat currencies, 87 and the requirement of
registration with FinCEN mentioned above, the failure of persons administering or offering exchange
services operating inside the United States to register triggers criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1960.
Because permission-less blockchains often have no administrators within the scope of FIN-2013-G001,
there may be no “person” with sufficient power over the blockchain governments can require to submit
themselves to the Four R’s style requirements. This is one of the few features of public, permission-less
blockchain technologies that Congress or Treasury might seek to address.
Unlike “wire transfers” and some other non-bank electronic transfers after Treasury’s “Travel
Rule” became effective, blockchain-based transactions do not show information identifying the counterparties (senders or recipients). 88 Transactions may take place on a peer-to-peer (“P2P”) basis with no
traditional intermediary involved 89 or from one location to a recipient’s “personal wallet or another type
of recipient unable to accept identifying information.” 90 In these environments, transactions may be
used to obscure the identities to transactions through anonymity or pseudonymity, but reconstruction is
possible, as noted above. To the extent a person subject to FinCEN’s 2013 Guidance is involved, that
person’s separate customer-identification and record-keeping compliance obligations should be
available to identify transaction participants in many current cryptocurrency offerings.
Blockchain-based transactions have been used for illicit transactions. Examples include the
notorious dark-web bazaar for narcotics and weapons known as “Silk Road,” whose founder, Ross
William Ulbricht, was identified, arrested and convicted of money laundering, using the pseudonymity of
bitcoins. 91 In 2018, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) identified two Iranian
See Jeffrey Gogo, Crypto-Based Transfers Can Cut Remittance Costs in Africa by 90%, BITCOIN.COM (April 23, 2019),
https://news.bitcoin.com/crypto-based-transfers-can-cut-remittance-costs-in-africa-by-90/ (describing relative
fees in percentages of dollars sent to Africa through banks and crypto systems); see also, Bitcoin is Now Moving
11% of Venmo’s Yearly Total in One Day, BITCOINIST.COM (April 11, 2019) (describing advantages in Bitcoin’s
“scaling solutions” as causes of “headaches” for competitors).
87
FinCEN 2013 Guidance, supra note 73, at 1-3 (“users” are exempt from “money services business” registration
requirements under this guidance).
88
See “’Onerous’ FATF recommendations Harmful for Crypto Transparency: Chainanalysis,” COINDESK.COM (April 12,
2019), https://www.coindesk.com/chainanalysis-onerous-fatf-recommendations-harmful-for-crypto-transparency
(commenting that the addresses used do not contain identification information and lack the capacity to carry it).
89
Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 1.
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Sam Thielman, Silk Road operator Ross Ulbricht sentenced to life in prison, TheGuardian.com (May 29, 2015,
21.02 BST) (and imposition of a double-life sentence).
86

16

intermediaries by name who were laundering proceeds from the Sam-Sam ransomware attacks and
placed them and their blockchain addresses on OFAC’s “Specially Designated Nationals” list. 92
Cryptocurrency proponents note the value of public blockchains to help trace and reconstruct
the value transfers and to identify the individuals involved. 93 The author of the Bitcoin white paper,
Satoshi Nakamoto, hailed the ability of blockchains to enable transactions to be associated with others –
by working back through the chain to the shortest entry on the chain and or identifying the transfers of
assets in forward or reverse sequence as the length of the addresses lengthens or shortens,
respectively. 94
B. The United States Has Other Tools to Deter and Help Detect Money Laundering Through
Permission-less Blockchain-Based Transactions
The United States imposes a variety of obligations on depository institutions and a broad array of
non-depository financial services providers designated as “financial institutions” collectively by the Bank
Secrecy Act, including amendments since 1970, and by the USA Patriot Act of 2001. 95 The obligations
include (1) establishment, monitoring, personnel training and re-retaining and revision of risk-based
anti-money-laundering compliance programs required by Section 352 of the USA Patriot Act, 96 (2)
transaction-record-keeping-and-retention requirements, 97 (3) threshold-based transaction reporting, 98
including “suspicious-activity” reports, 99 (4) requirements for customer-identification or beneficial
ownership information to be obtained at account opening, 100 (5) rules prohibiting having “shell
companies” as customers of banks, 101 (6) special rules for certain correspondent-banking
U.S. Dep’t. of Treasury, “Treasury Designates Iran-Based Financial Facilitators of Malicious Cyber Activity and for
the First Time Identifies Associated Digital Currency Addresses,” Nov. 28, 2018,
https://home.treasury/gov/news/press-releases/sm556 (describing both actions taken against two Iranians,
naming the Iranians, listing the individuals as “specially designated nationals,” and warning individuals dealing with
two Bitcoin addresses associated with these two “facilitators” that they might be subject to secondary sanctions
for violations of OFAC regulations and Executive Orders) [hereinafter “Treasury Action Identifying Bitcoin
Addresses”]. For more discussion of Treasury’s action, see Alastair Marsh, U.S. Exposes Bitcoin Addresses of
Sanctioned Iranians, BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov. 28, 2018, 1:10 PM EST),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-28/u-s-exposes-bitcoin-users-addresses-in-iran-cybersanctions.
93
Jonathan Levin and Jesse Spiro, Chainanalaysis Letter to Secretariat, Financial Action Task Force, April 8, 2019,
http://go.chainalysis.com/rs/503-FAP074/images/Chainalysis_Input_7b_Public_Statement.pdf?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWW1abU1HVTFOVFpsT0RrdyIsInQiOiIy
RUlOcHE1c3NOTEhWRzArVW9uVWw4OGdTUStYTXNDNVNRazRkTHFhMFBNMFpjbmNyRW1ha25uclpIVms0RUNKd
lwvTlZ0bWxFOGVoWDN1OHhPZm9mdTVPQjJmb2JHR09BRzFaR1UxNHU2dFhGdEQ4bUltZFh1UnJlMEJFYXErck0ifQ
%3D%3D (offering comments on Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, particularly paragraph 7(b) from a
company that provides “commercial blockchain intelligence software” to “map blockchain transactions to real
world entities”) [hereinafter “Levin and Spiro”].
94
See Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 2-3 (timestamp server and proof-of-work).
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31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2018).
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relationships, 102 and (7) special rules for cross-border transmittals of funds. 103 These requirements apply
to “money service businesses” and broker-dealers as well as banks. 104 Whistleblower complaints
augment these record-and-reporting regimes. 105 The Supreme Court held that the Bank Secrecy Act was
constitutional in a landmark decision in California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 106 with specific
reasoning that Congress legally could delegate rulemaking authority to the Secretary of the Treasury for
purposes encompassed by the original version of the Bank Secrecy Act.
In addition, under the wide-ranging statutes, Executive Orders, and regulations enforced by the
Office of Asset Controls (“OFAC”) in the Department of the Treasury, “U.S. persons” are prohibited from
doing business with entities and individuals on the OFAC’s published “Specially Designated Nationals”
(“SDN”) list. 107 The prohibition applies unless an exemption exists or the U.S. person obtains a license
specifically permitting the business or relationship to occur.
Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act 108 is among the most powerful tool for deterrence of money
laundering. The Director of the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”) also has authority through a process including notice-and-comment rulemaking to designate
jurisdictions of major money laundering concern 109 – with the result that specific entities will be banned
from access to the U.S. financial system. 110 These powers and practices have snared global banks, some
in more than one investigation. 111
Remedies that may be imposed for violations include asset freezes and forfeitures, criminal
penalties on individuals and organizations, designations of individuals, organizations, government

31 U.S.C. § 5318(i)(2) (2018).
31 U.S.C. § 5318(n) (2018).
104
31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2018).
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See Bradley Hope, Patricia Kowsmann, and Drew Hinshaw, supra n. 40. Other reports put the amount that
moved through the Estonian branch as high as $234 billion. Frances Coppola, The Banks That Helped Danske
Bank Estonia Launder Russian Money, FORBES.COM (Sept. 30, 2018, 5:42 pm) (also reporting that “much of the
money was paid in U.S. dollars, … and [the bank] needed help from other banks. Banks that had access to
Fedwire).
106
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Blockchain Companies Challenge the Bank Secrecy Act, FORBES.COM (June 28, 2018 1:25 PM),
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applied and prevailed, some of the conclusions in this essay could need revisiting.
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agencies, and property (particularly vessels) as prohibited for “U.S. persons” to engage with, and, using
Section 311, loss of access to U.S. financial systems. 112
Since Congress passed the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, 113 anti-moneylaundering compliance requirements have increased significantly. Some of these new tools apply to
banks and non-bank financial institutions, including some nonbank actors such as “money services
businesses.” 114 Others require record-keeping and threshold-based transaction reporting by persons
engaged in trades or business, 115 such as sellers of motor vehicles and luxury goods. FinCEN has issued
guidance on the application to cryptocurrency products and industry participants since March 2013 116
and working with other federal agencies has brought most of the enforcement actions since 2013
described in Subpart D of this Part and in the enforcement actions appendix to this essay.
These AML tools may seem old-fashioned in their reliance on information provided by financial
intermediaries to ferret out money launderers and new methods. However, the Panama Papers 117 and
Paradise Papers 118 investigations demonstrate that they remain powerful tools, for example, enabling
New York State’s Department of Financial Services to demand from banks it supervises information on
shell companies, customers, and transactions. 119
C. Internal Revenue Service Guidance

31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2018).
12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(2) (2018).
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See 31 C.F.R Parts 1010 (definitions of seller of prepaid access and “money services businesses”) and 1022 (rules
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information on this 2011 final rule, see U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Fin/ Crimes Enf. Net., Bank Secrecy Act Regulations –
Definitions and Other Regulations relating to Prepaid Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45403 (July 29, 2011).
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26 U.S.C. § 6050l (2018) (requiring records of the receipt of cash or currency of $10,000 or more in one or more
“related transactions” in a calendar year, annual notices to customers whose use of cash exceeds the threshold,
and annual reports to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service of personally identifiable information pertaining to those
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In addition to FinCEN’s regulations and guidance documents, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
declared in 2014 that virtual currencies were “property” not “currency.” 120 This decision exposed virtual
currency transactions to “capital gains” taxation under U.S. tax laws. Thus, persons who own virtual
currencies and securities, for example, would have to report and pay tax on any gains they received on
the later sale or use of the cryptocurrencies in transactions. IRS’ position means that users of virtual
currencies will need to track their bases in virtual currencies and the timing of transactions and
ownership transfers. Records needed to mitigate capital gains liabilities should assist the IRS and law
enforcement to the extent allowed by law.
D. U.S. Enforcement Actions before and after FinCEN’s March 2013 Guidance
The final source of regulatory action is represented by enforcement actions. A handful of these
actions illustrate the current capacity of U.S.-based law enforcement agencies and financial regulators to
deal with cryptocurrency industry participants who are not licensed, not registered with FinCEN, or are
name brands that had inadequate AML compliance programs. The online presence of many of the
defendants in U.S. enforcement actions made their detection more likely, which is a benefit of public,
permission-less blockchains. Currently, many blockchain-based transactions are, as Satoshi Nakamoto
described them, open to view and traceable on the blockchain even if the parties – or the embedded
“smart contracts” executing pre-arranged exchanges -- are anonymous or pseudonymous. The prospects
that transactions may be executed via “smart contracts” following the occurrence of a predetermined,
coded event or that more private cryptocurrencies, however, will make it more difficult to regulate
them for many purposes.
To illustrate the array of law enforcement actions brought by the United States, Appendix 1 to
this essay contains examples that demonstrate that law enforcement agencies have been able to detect
the use of blockchain-based technologies by entities with weak AML compliance programs or entities
accused to have engaged directly in money laundering. The examples in Appendix 1 show a range: they
are (1) not all criminal actions, (2) not all federal actions, (3) not presented in chronological order, and
(4) not presented in terms of the dollar amounts involved. The examples used in Appendix 1 are here
primarily to help readers assess the types of activity that attracted law enforcement agencies’ attention
and the enforcement approaches being used. There is no explanation of how law enforcement agencies
identified the targets or defendants: for such inside information, one needs a security clearance that I
do not possess.
V.

Cryptocurrency and Permission-less Blockchains Are Not the Major Issue in Tracing
Placement and Laying of Illicit Proceeds – Locating the Entity to Regulate Is

As law enforcement agencies and financial regulators have succeeded in limiting access by
money launderers to banks and other types of established financial services providers, the concern has
been that professional money launderers will shift their efforts to other methods. These professionals
may turn or already are turning to cryptocurrency and permission-less blockchain transactions for these

Int. Rev. Serv., Notice 2014-21, Frequently Asked Questions (March 25, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irsdrop.
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purposes. 121 This part looks at the steps that money-laundering professionals take to launder money,
the additional opportunities that permission-less blockchains offer these professionals and their clients
and some barriers to ultimate movement away from all-blockchain, no-intermediary-involved commerce
in goods or services, and tools that regulators and law enforcement agencies employ. Among the tools
that U.S. regulators and law enforcement agencies have available is USA Patriot Act Section 311, 122
available to deal with jurisdictions and actors that present special money-laundering concerns, which
this Part also discusses.
A. Placement of Value
In the United States, we regulate those providers that can receive “deposits” of money as banks
or credit unions, and those that can receive funds for prompt transmittal to others as “money
transmitters” or “money services businesses.” States regulate the non-depository providers operating as
“money transmitters” or “money services businesses.” 123 Bank regulators in two states recently opined
that receiving cryptocurrencies as opposed to “fiat currency” 124 or “sovereign currency” 125 is not “money
transmission” because the value being received is not “money.” 126 The guidance issued by Texas’
Banking Department, however, takes the position that “stable coins” such as Tether – cryptocurrencies
issued by centralized entities with values pegged to and at least theoretically supported by designated
fiat currencies 127 – as being within the definition of “money” 128 and, thus, confirmed that they are
subject to licensure and prudential regulation in Texas. 129
Unlike bank deposits, cash, and monetary instruments whose use and flows through the hands
of entities subject to the “Four 4’s,” once proceeds come in cryptocurrencies or are placed into
cryptocurrencies, the ownership is harder to trace than the movements along permission-less
blockchains. However, when the owner or controller of the cryptocurrency or other blockchain-based
asset wants to convert it to fiat currency or use it to acquire other assets whose acquisition requires
assistance from a “Four 4’s” regulated entity, the reason is that the persons using permission-less
blockchains may not be subject to know-your-customer compliance, record-keeping, or threshold-based
transaction reporting, including suspicious-activity reporting. Efforts to extend these AML and CTF
For additional information about prior cryptocurrencies and issues related to some of the more notorious, see
Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20
RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2393537.
122
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123
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124
Texas Dept. of Banking, Supervisory Memorandum 1037, at 3 (January 2, 2019, revised April 1, 2019),
https://www.dob.texas.gov (providing an excellent explanation of its reasoning why cryptocurrencies other than
stable coins are not “money”) [hereinafter “Texas Supervisory Memorandum”]; Pennsylvania Dept. of Banking and
Securities, “Money Trasnmitter Act Guidance for Virtual Currency Businesses,” at 1 (January 25, 2019),
https://www.dobs.pa.gove/Pages (differentiating “money transmitters” subject to licensure from most virtual
currency exchange platforms, kiosks, ATM, or vending machines) [hereinafter “Pennsylvania Revised Supervisory
Guidance for Virtual Currency Businesses”].
125
Texas Supervisory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 2 (explaining that sovereign-backed stable coins include
rights allowing the coin holder to redeem the stable coin for for sovereign currency from the issuer).
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requirements to cryptocurrencies have begun – in the U.S., with FinCEN’s guidance since 2013, as
described in Part IV, Section A of this essay, in New York State’s BitLicense regulations, 130 and under the
EC’s AMLD5. 131
B. Layering through Cryptocurrencies or Decentralized Ledgers
The speed at which transfers of value held in cryptocurrencies may occur and the degree of
anonymity or pseudonymity users expect make permission-less blockchain transactions attractive
means of “layering” illicit proceeds. Cryptocurrency transactions provide only pseudonymity. 132 This
pseudonymity “does not provide a user of blockchain technology with an absolute assurance that her
identity will not be discovered” by “a determined party with access to certain information….” 133
We might perceive that it is easier to layer illicit proceeds through jurisdictions with stricter
“bank secrecy” laws 134 than the U.S. or jurisdictions subject to the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) have. 135 A key feature of the GDPR, which went into effect in May 2018, 136 is the
grant to individuals to have their personal data erased. 137 In contrast, a key feature of blockchain
technologies is that there are no correction or deletion options. 138 Thus, the advantages of using certain
weak-AML jurisdictions and blockchain technologies to layer illicit proceeds appear greater than they
are likely to be in all jurisdictions.
C. Emergence of Layered Assets into Legitimate-Appearing Assets
The goal of placement and layering of illicit proceeds is to see them emerge as “clean assets.” Some
of the methods that these professionals use were revealed when The Guardian and The New York
Times, among other major newspapers, disclosed caches of transactions from the files of law firms in
Panama and Bermuda, respectively known as “the Panama Papers” 139 and “the Paradise Papers.” 140

23 NYCRR Part 200, at § 200.15 (2015).
AMLD5, supra note 2.
132
See Christopher Escobedo Hart, European Union: Blockchain and Data Privacy, Foley Hoag Security, Privacy and
the Law Blog, at 1, February 20, 2019, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=782988&email_access=on
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These disclosures appear to have relied on whistleblowers, rather than original law enforcement
investigations. The databases of records from each leak reveal a staggering global capacity to hide funds
and other assets through placement and layering by professionals. 141 There are no data of which I am
aware that suggest what percentage may be conducted using some form of blockchain technology.
Where do permission-less blockchains fit into the three-stage schema employed by moneylaundering professionals? Well, in many respects, they are available tools—but they are not yet fully
operational for complete transformation into legitimate-appearing assets. Permission-less blockchains
lack the centralized management or responsible parties that can be subjected to these “four R’s in
themselves,” because the Four R’s regimes depend on having some personal or legal entity to regulate.
However, in commerce, not all sellers of physical assets will accept cryptocurrencies or crypto assets for
their goods or services. For this reason, unless we anticipate economies in which those who use
permission-less blockchain transactions for the purpose of obscurity and never need access to fiat
currency or current financial intermediaries to utilize or receive proceeds or other value transfers, we
will not need to replace the Four R’s as central features of AML/CTF 142 enforcement efforts.
D. OFAC’s Enforcement of U.S. Sanctions Laws and Executive Orders
OFAC designates nation states, commercial and financial organizations, such as banks, non-profit
organizations and agencies of nation states, and individuals as persons with whom “U.S. persons” may
not engage in any form of business and publishes lists of these “specially designated nationals.” 143
Of these tools for deterrence of involvement with perpetrators of money laundering, Section 311 of
the USA Patriot Act 144 is among the most powerful. The Director of the Department of the Treasury’s
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) also has authority through a process including noticeand-comment rulemaking to designate jurisdictions of major money laundering concern 145 – with the
result that specific entities will be banned from access to the U.S. financial system. 146 These powers and
practices have snared global banks, some in more than one investigation. 147
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Remedies that may be imposed for violations include asset freezes and forfeitures, criminal
penalties on individuals and organizations, designations of individuals, organizations, government
agencies, and property (particularly vessels) as prohibited for “U.S. persons” to engage with.
Since Congress passed the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, 148 anti-moneylaundering compliance requirements have increased significantly. Some of these new tools apply to
banks and non-bank financial institutions, including some nonbank actors such as “money services
businesses.” 149 Others require record-keeping and threshold-based transaction reporting by persons
engaged in trades or business, 150 such as sellers of motor vehicles and luxury goods. FinCEN has issued
guidance on the application to cryptocurrency products and industry participants since March 2013 151
and working with other federal agencies has brought most of the enforcement actions since 2013
described in this part of this essay.
These AML tools may seem old-fashioned in their reliance on information provided by financial
intermediaries to ferret out money launderers and new methods, but we found from the Panama
Papers 152 and Paradise Papers 153 investigations that they remain powerful tools, for example, enabling
New York State’s Department of Financial Services to demand from banks it supervises information on
shell companies, customers, and transactions. 154
E. Permission-less Blockchains Are Not the Major Issue in Tracing Placement and Laying of Illicit
Proceeds – Identification of an Entity to Regulate Is

12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(2) (2018).
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information on this 2011 final rule, see U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Fin. Crimes Enf. Net., Bank Secrecy Act Regulations –
Definitions and Other Regulations relating to Prepaid Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45403 (July 29, 2011).
150
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As law enforcement agencies and financial regulators have succeeded in limiting access by
money launderers to banks and other types of regulated financial services providers, the concern has
been that professional money launderers will shift their efforts to other methods. Among the obvious
methods to which these professionals may turn or already are turning are cryptocurrency and
permission-less blockchain transactions. 155
Many AML laws and international agreements and enforcement protocols rely on four legal
cornerstones associated with traditional financial services “gatekeepers.” These four cornerstones are:
registration (or licensure), regulation, record-keeping, and (transaction) reporting. This essay will refer
to these four as “the Four Rs.” These four apply to regulated depository and non-depository providers of
financial services. U.S. entities serving as financial services gatekeepers currently include banks, trust
companies, credit unions, securities broker-dealers, money transmitters such as Western Union and
other money services businesses. Some virtual-currency businesses are in this group themselves.
Others, not yet subject to the Four Rs themselves, or their customers, likely will use services that
gatekeepers provide when they seek to exchange virtual currency or other crypto or digital assets for
fiat currency or need fiat currency to complete a transaction to purchase real- or digital-world goods or
services.
VI.

Global Anti-Money-Laundering Tools and Remedies; FATF’s 2018 and 2019 Guidance and
Recommendations

This Part of this essay describes various global AML initiatives that have implications for
cryptocurrencies and other crypto assets. These include policies developed by the Financial Action Task
Force (“FATF”).
The FATF has defined “virtual currency” as:
Virtual currency is a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and
functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store
of value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a
valid and legal offer of payment in any jurisdiction. It is not issued or guaranteed by any
jurisdiction, and fulfills the above functions only by agreement within the community of
users of the virtual currency. Virtual currency is distinguished from fiat currency (a.k.a.
“real currency,” “real money,” or “national currency”), which is the coin and paper
money of a country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; and is customarily
used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the issuing country. It is distinct from emoney, which is a digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer
value denominated in fiat currency. E-money is a digital transfer mechanism to fiat
currency – i.e., it electronically transfers value that has legal tender status. (bold font
original; punctuation maintained; footnotes omitted) 156
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problems with providers, see Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve,
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Thus, if oil-backed or gold-backed, cryptocurrencies backed by sovereigns – Venezuela, Russia, or China - are deemed “legal tender” by their sponsors, they will cease to be “virtual currency” under FATF’s
definition. However, they will become “property” subject to capital-gains-tax treatment under IRS’s
2014 guidance. 157
FATF has focused on enhancing global procedures for identifying and prosecuting persons and
entities engaged in money laundering, terrorist finance, and weapons proliferation for some time. Over
the past two years, FATF has amended its Recommendations including new provisions in its October
2018 amendments to Recommendation 15 158 and the February 2019 Draft Interpretive Note to FATF
Recommendation 15, 159 and its February 2018 Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing. 160 In April
2019, FATF published additional guidance on cryptocurrencies. 161
FATF should not abandon efforts to obtain stronger detection and enforcement tools aimed at
what this essay has called the “Four R’s” – registration or licensure, regulation, record-keeping, and
transactional reporting – which are all features of its October 2018 Recommendations that urge
member states to enact and use economic sanctions against persons committing or facilitating money
laundering, terrorism finance, and WMD proliferation. 162 These tools require a central management or
responsible person or entity on which to focus this type of regulatory requirements – the very attributes
that permission-less blockchains lack. Instead, FATF should continue to focus on entities already subject
to the “Four R’s” to observe value flowing from public permission-less blockchains into the hands of
regulated assets such as bank deposits, securities, commodities, or other tangible assets.
Demonstrating commitment to dealing with cryptocurrencies and intermediaries that those
transferring cryptocurrencies to others or exchanging fiat currencies for cryptocurrencies or vice versa,
in June 2019, FATF adopted and issued the February 2019 guidance mentioned above. This new
guidance took for the form of Interpretative Note to Recommendation 15 on New Technologies (also
known as “INR. 15”). This Interpretative Note 15 is intended to bind FATF member nations and virtual
currency asset providers (“VASPs”), as well as other entities that “engage in or provide virtual asset
products and services,” to extend their AML/CTF “preventive measures” described under FATF
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Recommendations. 163 Among the “full range” of AML/CTF measures, FATF included in its June 2019
Interpretative Note 15 are:
. . . customer due diligence, record-keeping, suspicious transaction reporting, and
screening all transactions for compliance with targeted financial sanctions, among other
measures, just like other entities subject to AML/CTF regulation. 164
In addition, FATF’s full range of supervisory recommendations for nation state members includes
ongoing risk-based assessments and mitigation of risks associated with virtual assets, licensure or
registration requirements, and supervision or monitoring of VASP and other providers by “competent
national authorities.” 165
Also, at its June 2019 Plenary Session, FATF published updated guidance entitled “Guidance for a RiskBased Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers,” which FATF described as “building
upon FATF’s ground-breaking 2015 guidance paper.” 166 The new guidance document may be found at
fatf-gafi.org.
VII.

Conclusions and Recommendations: Public Permission-less Blockchain Transactions
Present New Challenges and Offer New Opportunities to Regulators and Law Enforcement
Agencies

The themes I have used in this essay were aimed at finding ways to engage in “smart regulation,” as
Professors Vartanian and Ledig framed their May 2019 Public Policy Conference. I have come to them
though a longer journey than I expected when they first contacted me. Early on, I was concerned that
public, permission-less blockchains and transactions recorded on them would damage AML efforts and
enforcement tools that the United States and other nations with major money centers have enacted or
implemented. Later, the fact that blockchains cannot be “corrected or erased” caused a change in my
approach. I now view public permission-less blockchains as a valuable part of a robust AML enforcement
toolkit, rather than an absolute obstacle to the achievement of AML goals.
This is not to say that domestic and global efforts of deterrence and detection will not need to
be changed to meet new challenges arising from blockchain-based systems. This is likely, in part,
because blockchain-based transactions are likely to displace traditional, centrally managed forms of
value storage and execution of value transfers, with various depositories and transaction executors such
as trust companies, safety-deposit companies, and banks or regulated/licensed non-bank providers of
financial services. As these permission-less technologies continue to advance, they may enable value
transfers more generally to move to spaces farther from the gatekeepers subject to the “Four R’s,” the
term I have used in this essay to capture the four basic regulatory requirements that the United States,
the European Union’s AMLD5, and FATF’s 2018 and 2019 Recommendations impose: regulation or
licensure, regulation, record creation and maintenance requirements, and threshold-based transaction
reporting, including of transactions that strike the provider or counter-party as “suspicious.”
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This shift towards less transparent cryptocurrencies and away from longer-available
cryptocurrencies that may be regulated similarly to legacy money transmitters are can be seen in crypto
products such as Monero. 167 Monero promises its users that its product is a “digital currency that is
secure, private, and untraceable.” 168 Moreover, Monero advertises its crypto coins as “an obfuscated
public ledger, meaning anybody can broadcast or send transactions, but no outside observer can tell the
source, amount or destination.” Depending on how Monero is regulated—and under which
government’s or governments’ authority it may be regulated—its product or service may fall into the
second (low to low-middle level) or third (more serious) silos of concern I described at the outset of this
essay. But it clearly signals that hybrid blockchains with some public and some private attributes will be
in the marketplace and will require new AML approaches if they do not have a central administrator or
offer services as “exchanges.”
The key observation in the last paragraph about Monero is the absence of the word “regulated.”
In the U.S., if the provider is a “money services business” under FinCEN’s definition of that term, then
specific AML requirements will be imposed on this provider and product and require it to obtain
information from customers (in some states) and create and retain records of transactions. Thus, an
outside may not “observe” the “source, amount, or destination,” but Monero will be accountable for
having and keeping information about its customers and their transactions or instructions that Monero
will execute on their behalf?
Public permission-less blockchains, in contrast, offer permanent, non-correctable, non-erasable
records of transactions that are more open to view. Thus, these blockchains themselves may be seen as
part of the toolkits that law enforcement authorities will use – rather than as an existential threat to law
enforcement actions and governments’ AML priorities. Nevertheless, these blockchains operate without
central managements on which to place the Four R’s requirements or to impose civil or criminal
sanctions. In combination with newer investigatory methods, the integrity of blockchain-based
transactions and the audit trails they rely on already offer much assistance to private entities including
banks and securities firms to complete risk assessments on customers and fulfill their AML detection and
deterrence responsibilities, and, based on the enforcement actions described in the appendix to this
essay, to law enforcement agencies.
Recent actions against perpetrators of financial crimes and their facilitators suggest that
governments show existing capacities to “follow the money” through cryptographic substitutes.
Appendix 1 to this essay describes federal and state law enforcement actions addressing various types
of crypto asset law violations. Two more recent actions by the federal government demonstrate that
tools to “follow the money” are available to law enforcement agencies. The first of these actions is the
late 2018 designation by OFAC of two Iranians that facilitated Sam-Sam ransomware-attack money
laundering through bitcoins and, in a first, of the Iranians’ crypto-addresses as “specially designated
nationals” list with whom “U.S. persons” are prohibited from dealing. 169
The second example of detection by law enforcement agencies in the United States involves the
use of Executive Orders and implementing designations and regulations that the United States has used.
These Executive Order 13827 of March 19, 2018 (“Executive Order 13827-Venezuela”) placing the “any
https://www.getmonero.org.
Id.
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digital currency, digital coin, or digital token, that was issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of
Venezuela on or after January 9, 2018, are prohibited as of the date of this order.” 170 Executive Order
13827-Venezuela demonstrates the same type of AML deterrence tool – ordering economic sanctions
against a government and its cryptocurrency, prohibiting U.S. persons from transactions “related to,
provid[ing] financing for, and other dealings in” digital currency, coins or tokens 171 -- as OFAC used in the
Sam-Sam ransomware case against the Iranians. In this case, the President can deny access to U.S.
markets to cryptocurrencies whose purposes are declared “unlawful” by national legislatures such as
Venezuela’s National Assembly. 172
It is important to think about the ramifications of actions such as that brought by Venezuela
against the United States in the World Trade Organization for violations of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (“GATT”) 173 and General Agreement on Trade and Services (“GATS”)
obligations in response to Executive Order 13827 and other actions taken. 174 Among other things, the
Maduro Government charged that the United States is violating GATS Article II:1. That Article provides
that no member will treat another member less favorably than any other nation. 175 Exceptions to WTO
obligations arise if the member maintains that their actions relate to “essential security interests,” 176
and Executive Order 13827-Venezuela explicitly references a prior declaration of a national emergency
by the United States against Venezuela in two Executive Orders, Executive Order 13692 of March 8,
2015 177 and Executive Order 13808 of August 24, 2017. 178
The Maduro government also complained that that the United States was violating GATS Article
XVII:1, which provides that member nations will not treat financial services and service suppliers of
other nations less favorably than they treat similar providers in their own nations. 179 Although, as I note
below, I plan to follow this action closely, at the moment the United States can make a strong argument
based on the fact that this provision does not apply to government-sponsored currencies or securities.
Rather, it protects private enterprises that provide financial services or who are “service providers.”
Additional economic sanctions offer tools more in the nature of foreign policy enforcement,
rather than more traditional AML efforts. For example, since April 17, 2019, the Department of the
Executive Order 13827-Venezuela, supra note 36.
Id.
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Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has implemented additional sanctions relating to the Maduro
government in Venezuela, or enterprises and individuals. Specifically, on April 17, OFAC added a
designation of Banco Central de Venezuela pursuant to Executive Order 13850, as amended by
Executive Order 13857, “for operating in the financial sector of the Venezuela economy.” 180 OFAC also
added Banco Central de Venezuela to its “Specially Designated Nationals” list and this addition makes
any dealings with the Central Bank off-limits to all U.S. Persons unless OFAC issues a general or specific
license allowing certain activities in the future. 181 Citing Executive Order 13850, OFAC’s designation also
includes the Central Bank’s SWIFT/BIC BCVEVECA, and Tax ID No. G200001100 182 so that transactions
with that SWIFT account or Tax ID Number also are prohibited in the absence of a license.
As nation states – particularly, the Russia Federation, China, and Venezuela – focus on issuing
cryptocurrencies or tokens with the purpose of evading economic sanctions or of undermining the U.S.
dollar’s role in the global economy, we are likely to need new legal options. New legal options should go
beyond the “Four R’s” that I have described in this essay. These new options must be capable of being
taken without violating nation states’ obligations under international law or treaty obligations, but those
obligations should not be interpreted as preventing legal remedies to thwart products or providers
operating in my third silo, which includes fraudsters as well as rogue actors or rogue states. I plan to
continue to work on how the United States might approach these state-sponsored cryptocurrencies.
Among the tools that might be ramped up to deter evasion of current or new AML/CTF efforts is the
prospect that U.S. and other regulators will use their authority to send bad actors packing by imposition
of special measures authorized by Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act and curtailing access by them to
the payments systems in the United States and the trillions of USD of bank wire transfers and securities
transactions managed by these payment systems on a daily basis. 183 Another (if seldom used) tool is the
revocation of charters of U.S.-based banks, or of licenses by other non-bank providers who aid and abet
placement, layering, and cleansing of domestic and global financial crimes, as current U.S. law allows for
national banks. 184
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Work by the United States, the EC, and FATF should continue to focus on known “high-risk money
laundering jurisdictions” and to include jurisdictions that welcome blockchain-based businesses such as
Malta or that permit blockchain businesses to operate with little accountability – those that do not
impose licensure, regulation, record-keeping, or threshold-based reporting responsibilities. The
European Commission’s February 13, 2019 “high-risk-jurisdiction” list -- those with lax AML regulations
or enforcement. 185 FATF issued its recent list on February 22, 2019 and named 12 jurisdictions with
“strategic deficiencies” in their AML/CFT programs – including The Bahamas, Botswana, Cambodia,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Pakistan, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Yemen. 186 FATF
issued a Public Statement (also on February 22, 2019) describing additional concerns. 187 FATF also issued
an Interpretive Note on Recommendation 15 dealing specifically with virtual assets. 188
The following are some additional recommendations for new legal and cross-border collaborative
steps that the U.S. and other nations might take, perhaps with particular focus on maintaining the Four
R’s on the higher-risk products or providers I have assigned to the third silo, including:
1) retention by the U.S. of its current robust capacity and regulatory requirements to
detect and deter global financial crimes and use by the providers and products in the
third silo of U.S banking, securities, non-bank payment systems, and commodities
trading capacities;
2) provision of appropriate resources for FinCEN, OFAC, and other law enforcement
agencies including funding for artificial-intelligence tools and crypto-tracing-assets
training;
3) retention by the U.S. of requirements for licensure as required by the States, and
registration with FinCEN of certain providers of cryptocurrency services as “money
services businesses;”
4) monitoring of stablecoins, which are “cryptocurrencies linked for pricing purposes to a
real-world asset such as the United States Dollar”; 189
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5) supporting efforts by private operators of payments or payments-utilities systems such
as SWIFT 190 to create more transparency for transactions using its telecommunications
platform, including by using new technology to deliver unaltered remittance
information when payments occur including a unique transaction “identifier” (the
“UETR”), with trackable and traceable, end-to-end features and requirements that
SWIFT participants commit to anti-crime compliance and security;
6) enhancing resources and legal tools available to foreign intelligence units – as the EC’s
AMLD5 has proposed; 191
7) granting explicit new statutory legal authority in the United States to require
identification of owners of specified percentages of limited liability companies, 192
including the beneficiaries of trusts, 193 and working with other governments that hold
major financial centers and the United States’ major trading partners to do the same; 194
8) supporting new regulation like the EC’s new AMLD5 195 and prompt implementation of
their requirements following enactment as the EC’s schedule for national enactments by
January 10, 2020 requires; 196
9) using legal process in aid of criminal investigations across national borders via legal
process directed at facilities globally and at cloud storage, as the U.S. achieved in its
investigation of Liberty Reserve, 197 and German investigators achieved when they
obtained documents held by law firms inside their jurisdiction; 198
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10) deploying public-private partnerships to develop new tools to provide stronger end-ofend traceability of blockchain-based value transfers, such as the tracking solutions and
AMK/KYC compliance tools being developed by commercial firms; 199
11) exploring methods to enjoin uses of cloud-based services, social media, or Internet
Service Providers by blockchain-based enterprises that may be engaged in money
laundering; 200 and,
12) insisting that enterprises subject to the laws of the United States, European Union, and
elsewhere comply with the Four R’s continue to verify identify their customers; create
and maintain records of owners/customers and of transactions, including initial coin
offerings and coin/token trading in secondary markets, and strict compliance with U.S.
requirements enforced by OFAC.
The ability of the United States and its major trading partners that host major money markets to
contain money laundering will become more important as explained by Professor Eswar S. Prasad of
Cornell University and the Brookings Institution at the point at which “decentralized nonofficial
cryptocurrencies … start playing a bigger role as mediums of exchange.” 201 This likelihood—that I cannot
yet call an inevitability—makes reliance on enterprises or individuals subject to the Four R’s even more
important to future AML deterrence and detection.
To the extent that regulators and law enforcement agencies can continue to improve their
investigatory tools, with proper funding, data from public permission-less blockchains will be valuable
assets in AML detection and deterrence. Additionally, because traditional financial intermediaries such
as banks, broker-dealers, and other regulated financial services providers will continue to be involved
when the beneficiaries of illicit transactions want access to fiat currencies or traditional transactionexecution services from currently regulated entities, public permission-less blockchain transactions will
not be the only sources of information available. To this end, we will need more widespread adoption of
FATF’s Recommendation, including those issued in April 2019, and robust enforcement of AML laws by
G-20 members. Among the tools needed will be AML investigatory and enforcement authority where
not currently in place, such as for the European Banking Authority (“EBA”). 202 We also need to be
mindful of the costs of the compliance responsibilities that the gatekeepers I have described already
bear.
As we proceed, I urge that Congress, regulatory agencies, law enforcement agencies, and others
differentiate among the challenges presented by blockchain technologies generally (at the low end of
concern from my perspective at this point), by crypto products and services including cryptocurrencies
and tokens offered by entities in compliance with domestic laws where they do business (in the low-toE.g., CipherTrace, Blockchain Security, Crypto AML Solutions, www.ciphertrace.com/AML/Solutions; Marie
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low-middle middle ranges of concern depending on precisely how they are regulated now and the users
who favor them), and bad actors and opportunists (at the high end of concern because of the potential
for user/ consumer harm and the damage these actors can cause to other innovators as well). In this
last category, I would include hackers and issuers of currencies and tokens that have no intention of
allowing redemption of value exchanged or of providing any service to those who pay for it. This
cautious approach follows a long-held view that maintains there is little reason to regulate the already
sufficiently regulated. In other words, I see no reason to pile regulations actors, products and services
that are subject to and in compliance with applicable federal and state laws in the United States and our
major trading partners. The goal of future regulatory and law enforcement attention should be to
maintain capacity to “follow the money” trails beyond that used with traditional gatekeepers
(intermediaries, such as banks and securities-market participants) using the “smartest” approaches we
can devise.
Issues for future research include both Venezuela’s 2019 challenge at the WTO relating to U.S.
sanctions imposed on its Petro as violating other international law and global trade agreements 203 and
the proposals by the Russia Federation to create a sovereign cryptocurrency, as described briefly in Part
II.B., above. Governments seeking to protect their own financial, commercial, and trade systems against
government-sponsored cryptocurrencies designed to evade economic sanctions imposed by other
nation states will have to consider their choice of methods in light of World Trade Organization
responsibilities. Whether economic sanctions directed at a government-sponsored cryptocurrency can
be deemed to violate WTO obligations is a topic that goes beyond the assignment given to me by the
organizers of this George Mason Financial Services Roundtable, and so this issue is saved for future
research. I also intend, at some point, to write about sovereign-issued cryptocurrencies and national
security/cyber-warfare issues they may pose.
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Appendix 1
Examples of Enforcement Actions Dealing with Providers of Cryptocurrencies or Other CryptoAssets
The following are examples going back for more than ten years that demonstrate the
ability of federal and state law enforcement agencies to detect and prosecute persons and
entities whose activities violate federal or state laws relevant to registration or licensure,
creation and maintenance of records of customers and their transactions, and threshold-based
reporting to law enforcement agencies that I reviewed while pondering the central question in
this essay. These are not the only examples, particularly of enterprises or persons who have
faced scrutiny from securities and commodities regulatory agencies, but they provide a sense of
how regulators and enforcement agencies view the seriousness of certain types of activities.
1. Ripple Labs, Inc. and XRP II, LLC, its wholly owned subsidiary
Ripple is the best-known of the examples of U.S. enforcement actions I have chosen to mention
in this essay. FinCEN brought and settled its first civil enforcement action involving a virtual currency
exchange, securing a $700,000 civil penalty. 204 FinCEN and the Department of Justice charged Ripple
with willful violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, 205 failure to register with FinCEN as a “money services
business” (MSB), and failure to implement and maintain an anti-money-laundering compliance program
as required for MSBs. 206 The violation that FinCEN cited in its action reportedly occurred between March
6, 2013 through April 29, 2013, which I have noted in another essay bridges the date on which FinCEN
issued its first guidance on virtual currency providers as “money services businesses.”
2. BTC-e and Alexander Vinnik
In July 2017, the Department of Justice announced the indictment of BTC-e, AKA Canton
Business Corporation, and its alleged founder, a Russian national Alexander Vinnik, for operating an
unlicensed money services business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960, engaging in money laundering and a
conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1) and 1956(h), and
additional unlawful monetary transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. The Department also sought
criminal forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §982(a)(1). 207 The Superseding Indictment alleged that BTC-e
“was an international money-laundering scheme … that facilitated crimes, including computer hacking
and ransomware, fraud, identity theft, tax refund fraud schemes, public corruption, and drug
trafficking.” 208
Besides operating as an unlicensed money services business, the indictment charged that BTC-e
“lacked basic anti-money laundering controls and policies and, as such was attractive to those who
Press Release, FinCEN Fines Ripple Labs, Inc. in First Civil Enforcement Action against a Virtual Currency
Exchanger (May 5, 2015), http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/pdf/20150505.pdf.
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desired to conceal criminal proceeds as it made it more difficult for law enforcement to trace and
attribute funds.” 209 BTC-e allegedly did not require basic identifying customer information (e.g., name,
date of birth, address, or other identifiers) on account opening, and required only a user name,
password, and an email address. 210
The indictment also charged that, although based abroad, BTC-e operated its servers inside the
United States and did substantial amounts of business in the United States. 211 In addition to potential
criminal penalties, on July 26, 2017, FinCEN assessed a civil penalty of $110 million against BTC-e, and a
civil penalty of $12 million against Vinnik. 212
3. Liberty Reserve
Liberty Reserve was an online, centralized digital-currency exchange 213 based in Costa Rica,
alleged to have laundered approximately $6 billion in criminal proceeds. 214 On May 28, 2013, the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York unsealed a criminal indictment against Liberty Reserve
and certain principals and employees for operating an unlicensed money transmission business and
engaging in money laundering. 215 Liberty Reserve went out of business following this indictment and
prior to the entry of a guilty plea by its founder, Arthur Budovsky. 216
This is the only one of two examples of federal enforcement actions against virtual-currency
providers whose headquarters were outside the US at the time of the action. The other was against
BTC-e, discussed above. For purposes of later discussion, the jurisdictional hooks with BTC-e and Liberty
Reserve involved assets (servers) or customers inside the United States proper. A purely extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws did not arise in either case. From these actions and settlements, we can see that
the U.S. intends to apply its anti-money-laundering requirements to money services businesses that are
located abroad but do business in the United States. Whether this will suffice to keep providers using

Id. at paras. 3, 6.
Id. at para. 32.
211
Id. at paras. 20, 6, respectively.
212
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of California, San Francisco Div., “Russian National and
Bitcoin Exchange Charged in 21 Count Indictment For Operating Alleged International Money Laundering Scheme
And Allegedly Laundering Funds from Hack of Mt. Gox, at 3 (July, 26, 2017), https://www.justice/gov/usaondca/pr/russian-national-and-bitcoin-charged-21-count-indictment-operating-alleged-internationalmoney=laundering-scheme-and-allegely-laundering-funds-from-hack-of-Mt.-Gox (last visited December 28, 2018).
213
United States. v. BTC-e, Superseding Indictment, CR-16-0227 SI, paras. 21-22 (Jul. 26, 2017) (unsealed
indictment originally filed on Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pressrelease/file/984661/download.
214
Id. at [from Liberty reserve indictment]; BTC-e Indictment, supra note [55], at paras. 21-22.
215
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Charges Against Liberty Reserve, One
of World’s Largest Digital Currency Companies, and Seven of Its Principals and Employees for Allegedly Running A
$6 Billion Money Laundering Scheme (May 18, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May13/LibertyReservePR.php (last visited December 28, 2018).
For additional discussion of this and other virtual-currency developments in 2013, see generally Sarah Jane Hughes
and Stephen T. Middlebrook, Virtual Uncertainty: Developments in the Law Affecting Electronic Payments and
Financial Services, 69 BUS. LAW. 263 (2013).
216
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Founder of Liberty Reserve Pleads Guilty to Laundering More Than $250
million through His Digital Currency Business, (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/founder-libertyreserve-pleads-guilty-laudering-more-250-million-through-his-digital-currency-business.
209
210

36

permission-less blockchain technologies with neither customers nor servers or agents in the United
States is not yet clear.
Another important aspect of the prosecution of Liberty Reserve and Budovsky was the
admission in the plea agreement that Liberty Reserve had 600,000 accounts associated with users in the
United States and had laundered more than $250 million on a worldwide basis. 217 This dollar value
places Liberty Reserve’s effect on global money laundering above the amount now known about Danske
Bank’s Estonia branch, as described above.
4. E-Gold, Ltd.
One of the earliest actions to involve a provider of virtual-assets products and services – one
preceding both FinCEN’s 2011 regulation on “prepaid access” and its March 2013 guidance on Virtual
Currencies under the 2011 regulation -- was brought against an online provider known as e-Gold, Ltd. EGold was a digital currency backed by gold. The digital assets marketed by defendants preceded Bitcoin.
E-Gold allowed its customers to open accounts anonymously and its services enabled fast cross-border
transfers of value. 218 The action, filed in 2008, followed a return from a civil seizure warrant. 219
Defendant e-Gold, Ltd. challenged the seizure on grounds that it violated its Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights. A federal district court ruled in the government’s favor. The United States Courts of Appeal for
the D.C. Circuit, however, agreed with the e-Gold and individuals who were officers or shareholders in
the firm that their rights had been violated. 220 The methods that led investigators to e-Gold, Ltd. are
described in the Complaint. 221
With a transaction volume that made it second to PayPal on a global basis at that time, e-Gold
attracted bad actors and government investigators. 222 US regulators and the DOJ sought to force e-Gold,
Ltd. to register with FinCEN as a “money transmitter” – a classification that, apparently, e-Gold thought
was not applicable to its business model because it allowed customers to store value, in much the same
manner as banks’ customers store value with banks. 223 E-Gold, it turned out, had become the vehicle for
“carders” – enterprises that collected and sold information from stolen credit cards and extracted
payments, much like ransomware attacks today, and was aiding the carders in moving significant
amounts around the world. 224
5. Other Enforcement Actions Brought against Unlicensed Money Transmitters or Those Not
Registered with FinCEN

Id.
See Kim Zetter, Bullion and Bandits: The Improbable Rise and Fall of e-Gold, WIRED.COM (June 9, 2009 12:00 AM)
(providing valuable insights into the operations of e-Gold, Ltd. Including the customer base and transaction
volumes as well as its stores of gold and silver that backed the currency).
219
Complaint, United States v. E-Gold, Ltd. (2005).
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United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., No. 07-3704 (April 11, 2008), (vacating and remanding for further proceedings
consistent with the order). The opinion contains an excellent summary of the facts leading law enforcement to eGold, Ltd., and to the seizure of the equivalent of more than $1.4 million in e-Gold’s assets.
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There are numerous examples of enforcement actions brought against unlicensed money
transmitters or those not registered with FinCEN as being engaged in “money services businesses.” For
the purposes of this essay, however, I will offer only brief comments on a few of the earlier enforcement
actions so that audience members get the flavor of the actions. These actions represent a combination
of higher-tech and old-fashioned investigatory work, which is likely to remain the approach used to
ferret out illicit proceeds on permission-less blockchains.
a. Mutum Sigillum, LLC Account Seized from Dwolla
Shortly before the Liberty Reserve indictment was unsealed, on May 14, 2013, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) obtained a seizure warrant ordering the seizure and
forfeiture of an account belonging to Mutum Sigillum, LLC. 225 An affidavit filed in connection with the
application for the seizure warrant stated that Mutum Sigillum LLC was a U.S.-based subsidiary of Mt.
Gox, a large Bitcoin exchange based in Japan. 226 Based on information allegedly from an informat, DHS
alleged that Mutum Sigillum was engaged in “money transmission” without holding a license as a money
transmitter and so should have been, but was not registered with FinCEN in violation of 31 U.S.C. §
5330, and that Mt. Gox, the parent company, was operating in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1960. 227 Following
these actions, Mt. Gox announced that it would institute a new policy that required identity verification
before it would allow currency withdrawals or deposits, 228 a policy announcement that implies that no
such identification information had been required previously.
b. United States v. Murgio
Another of the early enforcement actions was brought against Anthony Murgio for operating an
unlicensed online currency exchange – a money transmitting business under FinCEN’s March 2013
guidance -- in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960. 229 Additional charges included conspiracy, money
laundering, and failure to file a suspicious activity report, which is required of providers of prepaid
access and others engaged in activities that make them “financial institutions” for purposes of the AML
requirements in U.S. laws. 230 Moreover, the complaint charged that Murgio and co-conspirators were
alleged to have knowingly facilitated “ransomware” attacks, for which the victim is asked to pay the
ransom in a virtual currency such as bitcoins. 231 Victims approached Murgio’s exchange, known as
coin.mx, to acquire the bitcoins used to pay ransoms, which the exchange provided. The exchange was
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accused to failing to file the suspicious activity report on the perpetrator or recipient of the bitcoins it
provided to the victim. 232
The complaint also alleged a more concerning fact about Murgio’s scheme: that Murgio had
acquired beneficial ownership of a small credit union in New Jersey and had used or planned to use the
credit union to access electronic payments networks in order to support other illegal activities. 233 The
risks presented by direct access to payments networks makes this action against Murgio and coconspirators unique among the U.S. enforcement actions of which I am aware.
c. State v. Espinoza
The third example does not involve federal law enforcement agencies, but rather state charges
against a man accused in 2013 of selling bitcoins directly for cash in Florida. 234 It also results from online
surveillance by law enforcement agencies. 235 This matter has current utility because, on January 30,
2019, the Third District Court of Appeals in Florida held 236 that selling bitcoins directly to another person
qualifies as “money transmission” 237 under Florida’s money transmitter statute. 238 In addition to
reviewing the basis for Florida’s position that bitcoin is covered by the definition of “payment
instrument,” 239 the court explained its view that the two-party transactions in which Espinoza sold
bitcoins for cash to individuals still constituted “money transmission” under the statute. 240 This
reasoning depends on the court’s view that Espinoza received cash in order to transmit virtual currency
to the person that paid the cash. 241 (In contract, FinCEN’s position has been that “money transmission”
of virtual currencies occurs when an intermediary sends value from one person to another 242 or sends
value owned by one person from one location to another location. 243)
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